




STRATEGY AND CONSTRAINTS ON SUPREME 
COURT OPINION ASSIGNMENT 
PAUL J. WAHLBECK†
 
 The assignment of the Supreme Court’s majority opinions is one of the princi-
pal prerogatives enjoyed by the Chief Justice.  A strategic Chief Justice is able to in-
fluence the course of legal policy through agenda setting; that is, the Chief Justice 
exercises influence over policy by choosing the Justice who will author an opinion, 
thereby determining which policy alternative will be developed in a majority opin-
ion draft.  Through strategic opinion assignment, then, the Chief is able to guide 
the Court to an outcome that is closest to his preference or that will result in the 
least policy loss.  Despite the importance of this prerogative for agenda setting and 
the development of the law, the Chief Justice operates within twin constraints:  the 
need for majority support for the proposed opinion and the efficient operation of 
the Court.  In particular, the Chief Justice often assigns opinions to Justices with 
whom he allies in order to maintain fragile conference majorities.  Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist also asserted that his assignments were based on the need to 
complete work on the cases and to maintain an equitable distribution of cases 
among the Justices.  Using data drawn from the papers of Justice Harry A. Black-
mun and other sources, I test these expectations through an examination of opin-
ion assignment during the Rehnquist Court from October Term 1986 through Oc-
tober Term 1993. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have characterized the Chief Justice as first among 
equals.1  The absence of additional powers of influence led former 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, before his ascension to the center 
seat, to describe the Chief Justice as presiding “over a conference not 
of eight subordinates, whom he may direct or instruct, but of eight as-
       † Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University.  This paper 
was prepared for presentation at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review’s Sympo-
sium, The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary, on November 10-11, 2005.  I would 
like to thank John Jacobs of Washington and Lee University and Ryan Schoen of The 
George Washington University for their assistance in this project. 
1 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82 (1964) (“[T]he 
Chief Justice, while usually thought of by his colleagues only as primus inter pares, does 
have some authority which other members of the Court do not possess.”); Sue Davis, 
Power on the Court:  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Opinion Assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66, 67 
(1990) (“The Chief Justice is often described as primus inter pares, ‘first among 
equals.’”). 
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sociates who, like him, have tenure during good behavior, and who 
are as independent as hogs on ice.”2  Nevertheless, the Chief Justice 
enjoys a powerful prerogative in the assignment of majority opinions.  
The power to assign authorship of the Court’s opinion provides the 
Chief with the capacity to direct the Court’s policy-making agenda.  
This assignment power is unique among the Chief’s duties in its abil-
ity to shape the development of the law. 
The Justices themselves recognize the potency of the Chief’s as-
signment power.  In the well-known exchange between Justice William 
O. Douglas and Chief Justice Warren E. Burger leading up to Roe v. 
Wade,3 Douglas criticized the assignment of the opinion to Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun.  When the Court chose to hold Roe for reargu-
ment in the 1972 Term, Douglas drafted a dissent that lay bare what 
he saw as the manipulation of the Court through opinion assignment.  
He suggested that the Chief Justice’s goal in assigning the opinion to 
Blackmun was “to keep control of the merits,” lamenting that this 
strategy “makes the decisions here depend on the manipulative skills 
of a Chief Justice.”4  Regardless of one’s view of Chief Justice Burger’s 
assignment in Roe, Douglas’s claims certainly merit attention, as the 
Chief Justice may seek to influence the Court’s agenda and the course 
of legal development through the exercise of his opinion assignment 
powers. 
There are other effects, beyond agenda setting, that opinion as-
signment can have on the Court.  Most notably, the choices that the 
Chief Justice makes in carrying out this duty affect the operation of 
the Court.  The Justices make clear that they have expectations for 
how the Chief will discharge this duty.  Specifically, they expect to ob-
tain their “fair share” of assignments.  Failure of a Chief Justice to eq-
uitably distribute assignments across Justices will inevitably lead to ten-
sion on the Court.  Douglas’s complaints about Chief Justice Burger 
culminated in his cry that Burger’s assignment tactics in Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner5 led “to a frayed and bitter Court full of needless strains and 
2 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 
637 (1976). 
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
4 Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice William J. Brennan 
(June 2, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter 
Douglas memorandum].  Douglas, of course, ultimately withdrew this dissent and sim-
ply noted his dissent to the decision to hold Roe for reargument.  Roe v. Wade, 408 
U.S. 919, 919 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
5 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
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quarrels.”6  Equity, though critical, is not the lone expectation held by 
the Justices.  Other norms can affect the functioning of the Court—
assigning opinions, for instance, to Justices who efficiently dispatch 
their writing chores.  As I will discuss shortly, former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist gave these factors, dubbed “organizational needs,” great 
significance in his assignment decisions.7
In the pages that follow, I will discuss the agenda-setting capacity 
of opinion assignment.  As will be evident, the Chief is able to guide—
or manipulate—the Court’s deliberation toward options that he most 
favors, either producing policy gain or minimizing policy loss.  This 
tendency is accentuated in unanimous or near-unanimous cases, but 
suppressed when the Chief has a fragile majority to preserve.  I then 
discuss the Chief’s pursuit of the Court’s organizational needs 
through opinion assignment.  As one sees in Justice Douglas’s letter, it 
has often been asserted that the Chief’s assignment decisions can af-
fect the smooth operation of the Court.  Finally, I offer empirical evi-
dence of the causal factors that guided Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opin-
ion assignment decisions from the 1986 to the 1993 Terms. 
I.  THE ASSIGNMENT OF MAJORITY OPINIONS 
When the Chief Justice is in the majority at the conference discus-
sion following oral arguments, it falls to him to assign the majority 
opinion.8  On those occasions when the Chief is in the conference 
minority, the senior Associate Justice in the majority receives the re-
sponsibility of assigning the opinion.9  At the conclusion of every oral 
6 Draft Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
(May 1, 1972) [hereinafter Douglas letter] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review).  This letter was written to protest Burger’s practice of passing at confer-
ence before later casting a vote with the majority and then assigning the opinion.  
Douglas never sent this letter to Burger, but kept it in his case file. 
7 See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief?  Opinion Assign-
ments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 423-24 (1996) (“[S]tudents of the 
Court have proposed an ‘organizational needs’ model in which the Chief distributes 
the workload evenly among justices, assigns cases to those justices who are most effi-
cient and encourages specialization by routinely assigning similar cases to the same 
justice.” (citations omitted)). 
8 ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:  LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 28 
(1986). 
9 See Sandra Lee Wood, In the Shadow of the Chief:  The Role of the Senior Asso-
ciate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 15-16 ( June 1994) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with Biddle Law Library, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania) (explaining that “[o]pinion assignment (when the Chief dis-
agrees) is certainly one” of the prerogatives of the senior Associate Justice). 
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argument session, which lasts two weeks, the Chief Justice distributes 
an assignment sheet to each chambers.  Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
marked, “When I was an associate justice I eagerly awaited the assign-
ments.”10  This assignment sheet lists the assignments made to the Jus-
tices, as well as the identity of the assignor if it is not the Chief 
Justice.11
What accounts for the Chief Justice’s choice in assigning opin-
ions?  In large part, political scientists explain this choice as an effort 
by the Chief Justice to advance his own strategic policy objectives, 
while meeting the Court’s organizational needs.  Most political scien-
tists who study decision making on the Court point to the Justices’ pol-
icy preferences as the primary factor.  This common perspective as-
sumes that Justices seek to further the legal outcomes that most 
closely comport with their own personal policy goals.12  The central 
role of policy preferences is evident in Justices’ decisions to grant or 
deny certiorari petitions,13 in their efforts to bargain with and accom-
10 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT:  HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 296 
(1987). 
11 If an Associate Justice assigns the opinion, his or her identity is revealed by ini-
tials next to the assignment.  Associate Justices assigned 14.1% of opinions during the 
Burger Court, FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFT-
ING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT:  THE COLLEGIAL GAME 32 (2000), and 18.9% during 
the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Opinion Assignment on the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 121, 123 (2005). 
12 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 23 (1998) 
(“[M]ost justices in most cases pursue policy; that is, they want to move the substantive 
content of law as close as possible to their preferred position.”); MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & 
WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 18 (“Supreme Court justices are strategic actors who pur-
sue their policy preferences within the strategic constraints of a case and the Court.”); 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (arguing that the best-supported explanation for Justices’ 
decision making is the “attitudinal model,” which holds that “the Supreme Court de-
cides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes of the 
justices”). 
13 Certiorari decisions have been explained as a means to provide uniformity in 
the face of conflicting lower court decisions, S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Cer-
tiorari Decisions:  Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 901, 910 (1984), 
but also as a mechanism to “pursue . . . policy goals by deciding cases with maximum 
potential impact on political, social, or economic policy,” Gregory A. Caldeira & John 
R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1109, 1111 (1988), and as strategic calculations to avoid consideration of 
cases whose outcomes could run counter to their preferences, Gregory A. Caldeira, 
John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Su-
preme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 566 (1999). 
 
2006] SUPREME COURT OPINION ASSIGNMENT 1733 
 
modate their colleagues,14 and even in their decisions to write sepa-
rate opinions.15
Opinion assignment is thus seen by those who maintain the pri-
macy of policy seeking on the Court as a means by which the Chief  
Justice pursues his policy goals.  As David Rohde and Harold Spaeth 
put it, “the rational strategy for the assignor is to assign the opinion to 
the justice whose views are most like his own on the issue being de-
cided.”16  This approach has two potential effects:  maximizing policy 
gain and minimizing policy loss.  When the Chief Justice’s preferred 
outcome is in ascendancy, he can maximize policy gain by assigning 
the opinion either to himself or to someone whose views are similar to 
his own.  In contrast, when the Chief’s views do not hold sway at con-
ference, he can minimize policy loss by joining the majority and as-
signing the opinion to the Justice in the majority who will do the least 
damage to legal policy, as he sees it.  As Abe Fortas once wrote:  “If the 
Chief Justice assigns the writing of the opinion of the Court to Mr. Jus-
tice A, a statement of profound consequence may emerge.  If he as-
signs it to Mr. Justice B, the opinion of the Court may be of limited 
consequence.”17
Conceptually, the Chief uses opinion assignment to influence the 
Court by using it as an agenda-setting tool.  First, by selecting who will 
draft the majority opinion, the Chief Justice can direct which policy 
alternatives will receive consideration by the Court.  As Justice Douglas 
asserted in his unpublished Roe opinion, the purpose of the confer-
14 MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 100 (asserting that the 
“paramount” factor shaping accommodation in opinion writing “is the ideological dis-
tance between the author and the other justices at the initial conference who ex-
pressed support for the majority position”); James F. Spriggs II, Forrest Maltzman & 
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court:  Justices’ Responses to Majority 
Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 485 (1999) (asserting, with empirical support, that “jus-
tices decide how to respond [to majority opinion drafts] based on the effect a choice 
will have on securing their policy goals”); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & 
Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court:  Bargaining and Accommodation on the United 
States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 294 (1998) (finding that an examination of 
the number of majority opinion drafts circulated demonstrates that an author’s ac-
commodation is influenced, in part, by the Justices’ bargaining tactics). 
15 See Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics of Dis-
sents and Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488, 489 (1999) (arguing 
that “separate opinions result from the justices’ pursuit of their policy preferences 
within both strategic and institutional constraints”). 
16 DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 174 
(1976). 
17 Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren:  The Enigma of Leadership, 84 YALE L.J. 405, 405 
(1975). 
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ence discussion is to determine the Court’s consensus for disposing of 
a case, with the assigned author serving as an agent to draft an opin-
ion consistent with that consensus.18  But the opinion author is able to 
direct the Court’s policy-making attention to a particular policy alter-
native.  In this way, the assigned author has the capacity to set the 
agenda for the Court, similar to what we see with government officials 
in other branches who are responsible for recommending a policy al-
ternative from among a set.19
Second, opinion assignment enables the Chief Justice to set the 
Court’s agenda not only by influencing which alternatives the Court 
considers, but also by guiding the order in which they are consid-
ered.20  Since the majority opinion is circulated before other Justices’ 
draft dissents or concurrences, the majority author can secure pre-
liminary commitments from her colleagues prior to their considera-
tion of competing opinions.  Moreover, an assigned author who does 
not favor the majority view may attempt to form a new majority by 
adding an alternative to the debate that may not have been consid-
ered previously by the Justices.21
II.  CONSTRAINTS ON AGENDA SETTING 
Even though the Chief Justice can use opinion assignment to ad-
vance his policy goals, he cannot pursue that objective without con-
straint.  The Chief operates within limits created either by the press of 
other goals that he values, such as a harmonious and smoothly operat-
ing Court, or by norms that limit his ability to pursue single-mindedly 
18 Douglas memorandum, supra note 4, at 1-3. 
19 See generally Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and 
Bureaucratic Politics, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 379 (1986) (comparing agenda control in the 
administrative and legislative contexts). 
20 See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION, at xi (1986) (ex-
amining how the “preferences of individual members of a group are amalgamated into 
a decision for the group as a whole”); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPU-
LISM:  A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF 
SOCIAL CHOICE 169-95 (1982) (presenting an empirical analysis of the role a group’s 
leader plays in controlling the agenda of the group’s decision-making process).  Some 
scholars of legislative behavior suggest that congressional committees are able to con-
trol outcomes through their control over the conference report, which constitutes the 
final proposal.  See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional 
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 87 (1987) (describing “pro-
posal power” as one of “the foundation[s] of committee power”). 
21 See Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme 
Court, 14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 96-98 (2002) (exploring the notion that adding al-
ternatives can divide a majority). 
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policy-based assignments.22  As the latter view suggests, the choices 
available to the Chief may be limited by the expectations held by his 
colleagues.  These expectations could be shaped by formal rules, such 
as the number of Justices needed to form a majority, or by informal 
norms, like an equitable distribution of opinions.23  Another way to 
conceptualize the linkage of these goals is to recognize that the Chief 
Justice, as the Court’s task leader,24 may pursue multiple goals simul-
taneously.25  The Chief’s pursuit of nonpolicy goals will necessarily 
hamper his ability to maximize policy gain in each case. 
As such, the Chief uses the opinion assignment power to enhance 
the legitimacy of the Court’s opinions, promote harmony on the 
bench, and ensure that the Court completes its work in a timely fash-
ion.  These goals can be, and according to many studies are, met by 
paying heed to each Justice’s share of the Court’s workload, efficiency 
in completing her assigned opinions, and issue specialization.26  Chief 
22 Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment 
on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551, 551 (2004). 
23 See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 53-66 (1992) (reviewing 
the role of institutions and expectations in strategic choice); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN 
P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS:  THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 21-
26 (1989) (listing sources of rules that constrain or dictate behavior); DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 36-53 
(1990) (discussing the role of informal and formal constraints on human interaction). 
24 See David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the 
Supreme Court, in THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM:  READINGS IN PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 
147, 147-48 (Sheldon Goldman & Thomas P. Jahnige eds., 1968) (reviewing the 
Chief’s leadership responsibilities). 
25 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 23-56 (1997) (identify-
ing the “diverse array of goals” pursued by Justices); GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES:  
RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 7-10 (1990) (arguing that rational deci-
sion makers simultaneously play multiple games based on different goals).  Maltzman 
and Wahlbeck find empirical support for the multiple-goal perspective over the view 
that the Chief is constrained only by the Court’s organizational needs.  Maltzman & 
Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 561. 
26 See Saul Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion Assignment on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 46 J. POL. 1217, 1217-18 (1984) (enumerating the possible rationales for 
issue specialization); Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, The Time Taken To Write Opinions as a 
Determinant of Opinion Assignments, 72 JUDICATURE 179, 182-84 (1988) (identifying effi-
ciency in completing earlier opinions as a significant factor in opinion assignment); 
Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Issue Specialization in Majority Opinion Assignment on 
the Burger Court,  39 W. POL. Q. 520, 523 (1986) (finding “evidence of specialization”); 
Davis, supra note 1, at 72 (examining the success of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s stated 
goal of distributing opinions evenly); Elliot E. Slotnick, The Equality Principle & Majority 
Opinion Assignment on the United States Supreme Court, 12 POLITY 318, 318-20 (1979) (dis-
cussing the complex reasoning in opinion assignment, particularly the equality norm); 
Harold J. Spaeth, Distributive Justice:  Majority Opinion Assignments in the Burger Court, 67 
JUDICATURE 299, 300 (1984) (studying “assignment equality”). 
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Justice Rehnquist claimed to pay particular attention to these consid-
erations.  On November 24, 1989, Rehnquist sent a memo to the Con-
ference reiterating his attention to equity, but giving notice that he 
planned to give additional weight to the Justices’ abilities to complete 
their assigned tasks.27  Rehnquist, despite his expressed emphasis on 
these considerations, was not unique.  Assignments made by Chief Jus-
tices Earl Warren and Warren Burger suggest that Rehnquist’s prede-
cessors also took these factors into consideration.28
Inevitably, the organizational needs of the Court and the Chief 
Justice’s strategic policy considerations can conflict when the Chief 
Justice assigns one of his colleagues the task of writing for a majority 
of the Court.  Unlike the Chief Justice, Associate Justices who make 
assignments do not have to balance these competing considerations, 
as they do not fill the institutional leadership role that the Chief does.  
This leaves Associate Justices freer to advance their policy goals 
through opinion assignment.29  Although the conflict between the 
pursuit of policy goals and the safeguarding of the Court’s organiza-
tional needs underlies much of the criticism of Chief Justice Burger’s 
assignment decisions, Rehnquist publicly stated that he allowed the 
organizational needs of the Court to trump strategic policy considera-
tions.30  While some differences emerge from studies of different 
Chief Justices, they tend to weigh factors in a similar manner. 
III.  OPINION ASSIGNMENT AS AGENDA SETTING 
The capacity of opinion assignment for agenda setting, and the 
Chief Justice’s use of it to minimize policy loss, is vividly illustrated in 
the 1972 case of Loper v. Beto.31  In 1969, Otis Loper filed one of “a 
steady succession of petitions” for habeas corpus to challenge his 1947 
27 Memorandum from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Conference, Pol-
icy Regarding Assignments (Nov. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Rehnquist memorandum] (on 
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (“[I]t only makes sense in the as-
signment of additional work to give some preference to those who are ‘current’ with 
respect to past work.”). 
28 See MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 35-53 (identifying and 
quantifying the factors used in assignments by Chief Justices Burger and Warren); 
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 558 (revealing that expertise, equity, ideology, 
and efficiency played into the assignment decisions of each Chief Justice). 
29 MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 40. 
30 See REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 297 (“I take into consideration the extent to 
which the various justices are current [in their workload].”). 
31 405 U.S. 473 (1972). 
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conviction for raping his stepdaughter.32  At issue was whether “the 
use of prior, void convictions for impeachment purposes deprive[s] a 
criminal defendant of due process of law where their use might well 
have influenced the outcome of the case.”33  At his 1947 trial, Loper 
testified on his own behalf, maintaining that he had not assaulted his 
stepdaughter.  During cross-examination, Loper conceded that he 
had four felony convictions between 1931 and 1940.  The jury found 
Loper guilty and sentenced him to fifty years in prison.  In 1969, 
Loper claimed that the convictions that were used to impeach his tes-
timony had been obtained without the benefit of counsel.  This claim 
was supported by his sworn testimony and court records.  Although his 
petition for habeas corpus was denied by the District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, a decision which was later affirmed by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to hear Loper’s appeal.34
At conference, according to the records of several retired Justices, 
including Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the conference expressed 
support for three distinct dispositions:  affirm the lower court 
(Rehnquist), remand for resentencing (Burger and Powell), and re-
verse the lower courts and remand for a new trial (Brennan, Stewart, 
White, Marshall, and Brennan).35  Douglas was absent from the argu-
ments and did not cast a conference vote, although he later voted to 
remand for a new trial. 
If Brennan’s and Powell’s docket sheets are an accurate record of 
the conference vote, the duty to assign the task of writing the majority 
opinion would fall to Justice Brennan as the senior Justice in the con-
ference majority.  However, the assignment sheet for the January ar-
gument session that Chief Justice Burger circulated on January 25, 
1972, indicated that Burger assigned himself this opinion.  In particu-
lar, Burger assigned this opinion as a per curiam to dismiss the case as 
32 Loper v. Beto, 440 F.2d 934, 936 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).  
Loper was paroled after serving fifteen years of his sentence.  With his release, he re-
ceived permission to move to Mississippi.  Loper’s parole was cut short, however, fol-
lowing his arrest for stealing a car.  Before Loper could be moved back to the Texas 
Department of Corrections, he escaped from the Carthage, Mississippi, jail and re-
mained at large for more than a year.  After his eventual capture, he was taken to 
Texas where he was again incarcerated.  Id. 
33 Loper v. Beto, 404 U.S. 821 (1971) (mem.), granting cert. to 440 F.2d 934 (5th 
Cir. 1971). 
34 The facts of Loper were derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion.  405 U.S. at 
474-80. 
35 Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Jan. 
26, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
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improvidently granted (DIG).  Brennan responded the next day with 
his letter recounting the vote that he had recorded in his personal 
notes, and stating that as the senior Justice in the conference majority, 
he would assign the opinion to Potter Stewart.  He said, “I had sup-
posed in that circumstance it would fall to me to assign the opinion.  
The assignment sheet, however, shows that you have assigned it to 
yourself to write an opinion dismissing [the appeal] as improvidently 
granted.  No one seems to have cast that vote.”36  Justice Stewart also 
wrote to the Chief to corroborate Brennan’s version of the conference 
vote:  “My notes do not show that anyone at Conference voted to dis-
miss this case as improvidently granted.”37
While Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the confusion over the 
assignment, he still maintained that a “‘DIG’ might be possible.”38  He 
concluded his memo by claiming, “Since I voted to reverse or ‘DIG’ I 
will make the assignment for whichever of those two finally commands 
a majority.”39  There is no evidence in the notes taken by Justices 
Brennan, Blackmun, or Powell to confirm Burger’s assertion.  Each 
recorded his preference for remanding the case for resentencing.  
Blackmun alone mentioned a DIG in his conference notes, quoting 
Byron White who was “sorry we took case.  But painted into corner.  
Clearly [a] miscarriage . . . [could] DIG.”40  White decided, however, that 
precedent dictated a new trial. 
There are two ways in which the Chief attempted to control the 
agenda in Loper :   first, by using sophisticated voting to join the major-
ity and select an opinion author who would minimize policy loss, and 
second, by proposing an alternative to the view supported by the ma-
jority.  Burger perhaps sought to minimize policy loss by casting a so-
phisticated vote.  In a multi-stage voting process, a sophisticated vote is 
one in which a person votes against her most preferred alternative in 
the first stage in order to obtain a better outcome in the second and 
final stage.  As Calvert and Fenno described it in the congressional set-
ting, sophisticated voting occurs “when a legislator votes against an 
amendment that he or she favors in principle, in order to improve 
36 Id. 
37 Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Jan. 26, 
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
38 Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Jan. 26, 
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
39 Id. 
40 Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes (Jan. 1972) (on file with the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
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chances for passage of the bill itself.”41  In the Supreme Court, sophis-
ticated voting occurs when a Justice votes for what she views as a 
suboptimal alternative at conference in order to obtain a more favor-
able final outcome.  Chief Justice Burger had been previously accused 
of casting “phony votes” whereby, as one Justice put it, he voted “with 
the majority so as to assign the opinion, and then he ends up in dis-
sent.”42
In the absence of a clear statement of his sincere preference in 
Loper, one must divine whether Burger’s conference vote was based on 
insincere preferences on the basis of his voting record in similar cases.  
In other right-to-counsel cases, Burger had supported the prosecution 
83.9% of the time and had always supported the government in cases 
involving prejudicial statements like those involved in Loper.43  
Rehnquist, the lone Justice who supported affirming the lower courts 
in Loper, favored the government in 86.0% of right-to-counsel cases.  
In contrast, for instance, Justice Stewart, to whom Justice Brennan 
sought to assign the decision in Loper, voted for the accused in 69.7% 
of the Court’s right-to-counsel cases during his tenure on the bench.  
Armed with these statistics, one might reasonably conclude that Chief 
Justice Burger cast his vote to remand not because he sincerely pre-
ferred this outcome, but rather because he sought to guide the Court 
through opinion assignment to a less damaging decision on the mer-
its.  In Loper, Burger could assign the case to one of several Justices 
who might be counted on to write a narrow opinion.  In hindsight, 
Harry Blackmun, who switched to the dissent, or Byron White, who 
ultimately concurred in the result, would have provided a more ac-
ceptable opinion to Burger than would the remaining majority Jus-
41 Randall L. Calvert & Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the 
Senate, 56 J. POL. 349, 349 (1994).  Other scholars have examined sophisticated voting 
in Congress.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Michael C. Munger, Investigating the Incidence 
of Killer Amendments in Congress, 65 J. POL. 498, 499 (2003) (discussing the use of sophis-
ticated voting in response to the introduction of a “killer amendment”); Andrew D. 
Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
361, 364-66 (2001) (identifying scenarios in which sophisticated voting increases); 
Craig Volden, Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings, 60 J. POL. 149, 151 (1998) 
(arguing that sophisticated voting rises where supermajorities are required to override 
a veto or end a filibuster). 
42 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION:  HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 45 
(1996). 
43 These preference indicators are derived from Harold J. Spaeth, The S. Sidney 
Ulmer Project:  U.S. Supreme Court Databases, The Original United States Supreme 
Court Judicial Database 1953-2005 Terms, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/ 
sctdata.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
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tices.44  When this gambit failed, however, Chief Justice Burger re-
lented and released the prerogative to assign the opinion to Douglas, 
who cast a vote to reverse by memo on January 27, 1972.45
Second, the Chief Justice used the opinion assignment to intro-
duce an alternative disposition.46  Although three distinct positions 
gained adherents at conference, Chief Justice Burger assigned the 
opinion in Loper for a fourth disposition.  This undoubtedly was his 
attempt to divide the otherwise solid majority in favor of remanding 
the case for a new trial.  In essence, a strategic leader can propose a 
new alternative that will introduce instability in the form of a voting 
cycle.47  If a vote had pit the Justices supporting remand for resentenc-
ing against those favoring remand for a new trial, the conference 
would have supported a new trial.  But it is possible, as Burger 
claimed, that the DIG disposition might have defeated the remand for 
a new trial disposition.  This voting instability appealed to Burger as it 
allowed him to minimize his presumed policy loss if a majority of his 
colleagues would find a DIG preferable to the outcome they initially 
supported at conference. 
The effect on voting stability of adding an alternative is apparent 
in the Justices’ preference orderings.  Assume that Burger had the fol-
lowing preference orderings over the two dominant conference posi-
tions: 
Remand for Resentencing > Remand for New Trial 
44 Blackmun supported the prosecution in 51.2% of right-to-counsel cases, while 
White sided with the government in 70.8% of these cases. 
45 See Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
(Jan. 27, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (voting to re-
verse despite having abstained at conference); Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger to Justice William O. Douglas (Jan. 31, 1972) (on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review) (confirming Douglas’s vote and indicating that Douglas 
should assign the opinion); Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger (Jan. 31, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view) (allowing the earlier assignment of the opinion to Justice Stewart to stand). 
46 Other Justices can propose alternatives in opinions they circulate to the Court, 
but the Chief Justice can initiate this switch with the opinion assignment.  For instance, 
Justice Brennan’s first draft for the majority in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 
(1990), was accompanied by a cover letter that said, “Although I originally voted to af-
firm the judgment of the state court, I now believe that the proper disposition of the 
case, given our conclusions, is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceed-
ings.  Accordingly, I have styled the draft opinion in this manner.”  Memorandum 
from Justice William J. Brennan to the Conference (May 31, 1991) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
47 See Epstein & Shvetsova, supra note 21, at 98 (discussing how the Chief Justice 
can create a cycle of preferences so as to control the agenda). 
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In contrast, the majority’s preference ordering was: 
Remand for New Trial > Remand for Resentencing 
White’s comments at conference, however, suggested that another al-
ternative, a DIG, might be able to siphon votes from the majority.  
White made clear that his preference ordering was: 
DIG > Remand for New Trial > Remand for Resentencing 
Although White would support a remand for a new trial over a re-
mand for resentencing, it was reasonable to conclude that he might 
be persuaded to cast a vote to DIG the case. 
In light of the controversy over Burger’s assignment, the confer-
ence discussed this case again on January 27.  At that time, according 
to Blackmun’s notes, several Justices voiced support for a DIG, includ-
ing the Chief Justice and Powell.48  Rehnquist continued to assert that 
his preference was to affirm the lower court.  Stewart argued that a 
“DIG would be the last thing to do” and that “we are obligated to de-
cide” the case.  White stated that “I voted to deny. . . . But we did grant 
it.  Our decision—reverse.”49  Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, which 
concluded with his stated preference for a DIG, attracted the support 
of Justice Blackmun.  Blackmun switched from his conference vote to 
remand for a new trial to Rehnquist’s dissent, which supported either 
a DIG or an affirmance of the lower court.  Ultimately, Rehnquist’s 
48 See Blackmun, supra note 40 (recording that Burger voted to “[e]ither DIG or 
R[everse] & remand” and that Powell “c[oul]d DIG”). 
49 Id.  In following this course of action, White adhered to a strict interpretation of 
the Rule of Four and DIGs.  See Scott A. Hendrickson, To DIG or Not To DIG:  Using 
DIGs to Examine Supreme Court Decision Making and Agenda Setting 8 n.15 (Work-
ing Paper 2003), http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~sahendri/workingpaper/apsa03.pdf 
(noting that White “digged certiorari over the dissent of the only four justices . . . who 
had voted to grant” it in Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497 (1971)).  
For New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam), Justice John Paul Stevens 
wrote a private letter to Justice Brennan saying that he could join Brennan’s per cu-
riam opinion dismissing the case as improvidently granted if one of the original four 
votes to grant joined as well.  Stevens added, “I am most reluctant, however, to join this 
kind of disposition over the dissent of the four Members of the Court who voted to 
grant the case, even though, as you know, I think this was a particularly unwise grant.”  
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar. 1, 1984) (on 
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).  Interestingly, White dissented in 
Uplinger, claiming that the case was properly before the Supreme Court and should be 
addressed.  He concluded that a DIG was not the “proper course.”  467 U.S. at 252 
(White, J., dissenting).  In Loper, there were seven sitting Justices when certiorari was 
granted on the votes of Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. 
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opinion won the support of four Justices, but not of Justice White, 
who wrote an opinion concurring in the result. 
IV.  CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF AGENDA SETTING 
The Chief Justice does not uniformly assign opinions to his allies, 
as the agenda-setting argument would hypothesize.  Indeed, there are 
instances where a strategic Chief will signal a retreat from this goal.  
Most notably, the Chief may reach beyond his usual allies when the 
majority is particularly fragile.  The literature has maintained that the 
Chief Justice, when facing a narrow majority, may be more likely to as-
sign the opinion to a moderate member of the Court.  Two distinct 
reasons have been given for this tactic:  first, this would avoid the 
breakup of the Chief’s majority coalition, and second, it may encour-
age dissenters to join the opinion of the Court.50  By assigning this 
opinion to a more ideologically distant Justice in an effort to maintain 
a majority for his preferred disposition, the Chief minimizes policy 
loss. 
The risk associated with assigning an opinion to a Justice close to 
one of the ideological extremes was evident in United States v. Glaxo 
Group Ltd.51  Glaxo concerned an antitrust claim against British drug 
manufacturers stemming from their sublicensing agreements with 
American companies to sell their product while prohibiting bulk sales 
of their drug without prior approval.  The District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia ruled in favor of the government, finding that these 
bulk sales restraints were a violation of the Sherman Act.  As a remedy, 
the government sought to invalidate the underlying patents, but the 
district court denied this relief because the companies did not rely on 
their patents to defend the antitrust claim.52
50 See Danelski, supra note 24, at 156-57 (explaining how the Chief’s assignments 
may influence the disposition of a case).  Some have found that this strategy may not 
work, as moderate Justices are not more likely to maintain the original coalition than 
their more extreme colleagues, see, e.g., Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority 
Opinion Assignments and the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 80 (1988) (summarizing the results of an empirical study of Su-
preme Court coalitions), and dissenters are not more likely to join a moderate’s opin-
ion, see Saul Brenner et al., Increasing the Size of Minimum Winning Original Coalitions on 
the Warren Court, 23 POLITY 309, 315 (1990) (describing a bivariate analysis of the War-
ren Court coalitions and how often moderate opinions are joined by original dissent-
ers). 
51 410 U.S. 52 (1973). 
52 Id. at 56. 
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After the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case on Novem-
ber 9, 1972, six Justices voted at conference to affirm the district 
court’s decision.  Since the Chief Justice and the two most senior As-
sociate Justices, Douglas and Brennan, formed the conference minor-
ity, the power to assign the opinion fell to Justice Stewart.  Stewart in-
formed Chief Justice Burger on November 13, 1972, that “I have asked 
Bill Rehnquist to write the opinion for the Court in this case.”53
This choice, according to much of the literature, was not the op-
timal move; instead, opinion writing should have been delegated to 
the Justice at the ideological center of the Court, that is, the median 
Justice.  In 1972, the Court median in economic cases was Stewart 
himself.54  Instead, as seen in Figure 1, Stewart assigned the opinion to 
one of the conference majority Justices closest to the conservative 
pole, Justice Rehnquist.  The risk in assigning the opinion to one of 
these Justices was that it could alienate the Justices closest to the dis-
senters, prompting them to abandon their conference position in fa-
vor of the minority view.55  The conference majority Justices who were 
most at risk of defection were Justice White, who disagreed with 
Rehnquist in economic cases about 29% of the time, and Justice Mar-
shall, who supported the conservative, or pro-business, position in less 
than half of the Court’s previous economic cases.  The strategically 







53 Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Nov. 13, 
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
54 As a measure of ideology, I used the data from Spaeth, supra note 43, to calcu-
late the percentage of cases in which a Justice voted in a liberal direction in each value 
area in Terms prior to the one in which the case was considered.  I estimate a new Jus-
tice’s ideology following the method discussed in Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs 
II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 349, 361-62 (2005) (modeling future voting behavior on Spaeth’s data and 
distance from the Court’s median). 
55 Studies of the fluidity of Justices’ votes between conference and the final re-
corded vote on the merits show that a Justice is more likely to change her vote when 
the dissent is closer to her own views than the majority opinion author.  Forrest Maltz-
man & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger 
Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581, 588 (1996). 
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The consequence of this strategic error was apparent as soon as 
Justice Rehnquist’s draft majority opinion circulated on November 22, 
1972.  Justice White responded by remarking that he had “second 
thoughts” and was “considering a dissent with respect to the Govern-
ment’s authority in specified situations to demonstrate the invalidity 
of a patent.”57  After White circulated his dissent a week later, Justice 
Marshall added his voice to the mounting opposition to Rehnquist’s 
draft.  Marshall wrote Rehnquist on November 28, 1972, stating that 
he was “somewhere between Douglas and White.  I am sorry I cannot 
join your opinion insofar as remedy is concerned.”58  The day after 
White’s proposed dissent was circulated, Marshall joined White’s dis-
sent. 
With these two defections, the ranks of the Justices opposing 
Rehnquist’s opinion had swollen from the three original dissenters to 
a majority of five Justices.  Chief Justice Burger promptly responded to 
this development by writing a memorandum to the conference:  “It 
appears that the resolution of this case is undergoing some evolution 
and that Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s proposed opinion does not enlist a 
majority.”59  He then reassigned the majority opinion to Justice White.  
Later, and without comment, Justice Powell also switched sides and 
joined White’s opinion on December 27, 1972, making the final tally 
six to three to reverse the lower court’s decision.60
56 Note:  Conference majority Justices in italics. 
57 Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov. 27, 
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
58 Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov. 
28, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
59 Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Dec. 7, 
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
60 United States v. Glaxo, 410 U.S. 52, 53 (1973). 
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A few years later, a chastened Justice Stewart wrote to Chief Justice 
Burger when assigning opinions in Tully v. Griffin, Inc.61 and United 
States v. Foster Lumber Co.62 following close conference votes: 
I was asked to assign the opinions in both of these cases, which were the 
subjects of closely divided Conference votes.  Having in mind my dismal 
track record as an assignor (see, e.g., U.S. v. Glaxco [sic] Group Ltd., 410 
U.S. 52), I have decided to undertake both opinions myself, rather than 
inflict them upon any of my colleagues in the fragile majorities.
63
Of course, had Stewart assigned Glaxo to himself, the Court me-
dian in economic cases in 1972, he very well might have avoided the 
eventual debate and switch in outcomes. 
V.  ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
Not only is the effect of agenda-setting policy calculations condi-
tioned by the size of the conference majority, but Chief Justices are 
apt to place greater weight on policy views when assigning cases that 
promise to make a significant contribution to public or legal policy.  
Underlying this weighting is the assumption that cases are not of 
equal worth in the eyes of the Justices.  Justice Powell once com-
plained to Chief Justice Burger that he had been assigned “two lemons 
last months [sic] (two Social Security statutory construction cases).”64  
In contrast, Rehnquist commented that, as an Associate Justice, he 
“eagerly awaited the assignments” as “the office offers no greater re-
ward than the opportunity to author an opinion on an important 
61 429 U.S. 68 (1976) 
62 429 U.S. 32 (1976). 
63 Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Oct. 8, 
1976) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
64 Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
(Mar. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Powell memorandum] (on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review).  Chief Justice Burger sent a note to Justice Powell during 
arguments in UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986), criticizing Powell’s vote to grant cer-
tiorari.  During oral arguments, Burger passed Powell a note saying, “You can pay 
$25.00 to the Coffee Fund—for taking this case.  If it turns out ‘right’ you can work out 
your fine by writing it!”  Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice 
Lewis F. Powell (Mar. 25, 1986) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view).  Powell responded by writing a check for $25 and passing it to Burger with a 
note that said, “I did ‘blow it’ by voting to grant.  I’ll pay the $25 (check enclosed) on 
assurance the case will not be assigned to me!  After all you gave me two lemons last 
months [sic] (two Social Security statutory construction cases).  Also I’m still hurting 
from having to write Matsushita [Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986)].”  Powell memorandum, supra.  Chief Justice Burger refused the check. 
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point of constitutional law.”65  Research shows that the Chief Justice 
gives greater weight to a colleague’s ideology in politically salient cas-
es66 and disproportionately self-assigns legally salient cases.67  The 
agenda-setting explanation would maintain that assignments to allies 
in these cases serve the Chief Justice by ensuring policy gains in these 
especially important cases. 
VI.  ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
While opinion assignment offers the Chief Justice a potent 
weapon to shape the law, most recent Chief Justices have asserted that 
they eschewed those concerns and attempted to assign opinions fairly 
to their colleagues.  Chief Justice Earl Warren remarked, “I do believe 
that if [the assignment process] wasn’t done with regard to fairness, it 
could well lead to great disruption in the Court.”68  Rehnquist main-
tained that he tried “to be as evenhanded as possible as far as numbers 
of cases assigned to each justice.”69  The Chief Justice does not have 
unbounded power to pursue his policy-based interests.  The Chief 
confronts the needs of the Court as an organization. 
One of the principal constraints on the Chief Justice’s assignments 
is the norm to equitably distribute opinions to the Justices.  Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist claimed that during his first three Terms as Chief, “the 
principal rule I have followed in assigning opinions is to give everyone 
approximately the same number of assignments of opinions for the 
Court during any one Term.”70  Although Rehnquist explicitly men-
tioned his benchmark as equity within the Term, an intermediate eq-
uity goal is the distribution of opinions from each argument session. 
65 REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 296. 
66 MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 35-36; Maltzman & Wahl-
beck, supra note 22, at 552; David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority 
Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652, 655 (1972); 
Elliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court?  Majority Opinion Assignments from Taft to Bur-
ger, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 60, 60-62 (1979); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of Power in the Supreme 
Court:  The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-1960, 19 J. PUB. L. 49, 67 (1970). 
67 Saul Brenner, The Chief Justices’ Self Assignment of Majority Opinions in Salient Cases, 
30 SOC. SCI. J. 143, 144 (1993); Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 552; Rohde, 
supra note 66, at 656; Elliot E. Slotnick, The Chief Justices and Self-Assignment of Majority 
Opinions, 31 W. POL. Q. 219, 219 (1978). 
68 Anthony Lewis, A Talk with Warren on Crime, the Court, the Country, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Oct. 19, 1969, at 130. 
69 REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 297. 
70 Memorandum from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Conference,  Pol-
icy Regarding Assignments (Nov. 24, 1989) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review). 
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The Justices’ correspondence is replete with references to their 
desire to maintain balance across the chambers within an assignment 
cycle.  Almost apologetically, Chief Justice Burger wrote a cover letter 
to the conference accompanying the assignments, stating that “[w]ith 
only seven cases, there was not enough to ‘go around.’”71  The desire 
to maintain equity within an assignment cycle is also seen in the Jus-
tices’ efforts to trade assignments if a Justice received an assignment 
that she could not complete.  When Justice Powell received the as-
signment in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,72 he announced that, 
given his position favoring dismissal for want of an adequately pre-
sented federal question, he could not write a per curiam opinion for 
the Court without also authoring a dissent.  Burger replied, “I accept 
your ‘abdication’.  However there is no occasion for a ‘trade’ since 
there is no comparable canine special in the last week’s ‘litter’.  I will 
ask someone else to try to deal with this critter.”73  In Fiallo v. Bell,74 
another case where a trade was not feasible, Burger wrote that he 
would make it up “on the ‘next round.’”75
In addition to concerns about equity, Chief Justices have ex-
pressed an interest in facilitating the timely completion of the Court’s 
workload.  The Justices are acutely aware of the “June crunch,” when 
the Court finishes its work on cases heard during the Term—many 
memos among the Justices allude to the coming end of the Court’s 
Term.  As the Court’s administrative leader, the Chief Justice has re-
sponsibility for prodding his colleagues to fulfill their obligations be-
fore the end of June.  Chief Justice Burger once prompted his col-
leagues, “This is the time of the year when we remind ourselves of the 
May 31 ‘target date’ to have all assigned opinions in circulation.”76
This constraint affects the Chief Justices’ opinion assignment prac-
tices as they seek “to avoid the annual ‘June crunch,’ at which time so 
much of our work seems to pile up.”77  In a memorandum to the Con-
ference on November 24, 1989, Chief Justice Rehnquist informed his 
71 Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Oct. 15, 
1977) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
72 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
73 Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell (Dec. 10, 
1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
74 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
75 Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Dec. 13, 
1976) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
76 Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (May 10, 
1983) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
77 REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 297. 
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colleagues that he would “put more weight than I have in the past on” 
whether a chambers has overdue uncirculated majority or dissenting 
opinions or delinquent votes.78  Although Rehnquist moved such effi-
ciency to the forefront of his assignment calculus, other Chief Justices 
were likewise motivated by their colleagues’ propensity to complete 
opinion-writing chores quickly.  In a study of assignments made by the 
Chief Justice between 1953 and 1990, Maltzman and Wahlbeck found 
that selections by these Chiefs were explained, in part, by which Jus-
tice could promptly complete opinion writing, especially as the end of 
the Court’s term approached.79
VII.  CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST’S OPINION ASSIGNMENTS 
Whereas Chief Justice Burger was often criticized for trying to im-
pose his will on the Court through opinion assignments,80 research 
indicates that Chief Justice Rehnquist was not motivated by ideological 
concerns in his assignment decisions.  A study of assignments between 
1987 and 1989 reveals that Rehnquist did not systematically assign 
opinions to his closest allies.81  In contrast, the study of assignments 
from the 1953 to the 1990 Terms found empirical support for the sup-
position that Chief Justices favor their allies.82  The question that I 
now address is whether Rehnquist sought to direct the Court and its 
doctrinal development through the exercise of this prerogative. 
I used the files maintained by Justice Blackmun, currently housed 
at the Library of Congress, to identify Chief Justice Rehnquist’s as-
signments during the Terms between 1986 and 1993.  The papers con-
tain the assignment sheets circulated by both Chief Justices Burger 
and Rehnquist.  These assignment sheets are the original sources 
through which Justices received their writing assignments.  If one were 
to simply consult the final opinions to ascertain who assigned the ma-
jority opinion or who received the assignment, one would introduce 
significant measurement error.  Looking at the assignors, first, if one 
assumed the opinion was assigned by the most senior Justice in the fi-
nal majority coalition, one would be wrong in the 23.9% of cases in 
which someone other than Rehnquist actually assigned the opinion 
even though Rehnquist ultimately joined the majority coalition.  Sec-
78 Id. 
79 Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 552-53. 
80 Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 439. 
81 Id. at 421. 
82 Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 558. 
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ond, one would be mistaken in assuming that the eventual majority 
author received the initial assignment, in 5.2% of the cases assigned 
by the Chief Justice.  Thus, rather than examine the published opin-
ions to attribute assignments, I limit the following analysis to those 
Terms for which original assignment sheets are available. 
According to the assignment sheets found in Blackmun’s papers, 
Rehnquist assigned a substantial share of the majority opinions during 
this portion of his tenure as Chief, as seen in Table 1.  Justice Brennan 
assigned the most majority opinions among Associate Justices, assign-
ing more than 10% of all opinions for the 1986-1993 period, despite 
his retirement following the 1989 Term.  Table 2 presents the number 
of assignments made to each Justice by Chief Justice Rehnquist or an 
Associate Justice.  As that table shows, Chief Justice Rehnquist self-
assigned frequently, retaining more assignments for himself than he 
delegated to any other single Justice.  The other Justices who were 
regular beneficiaries of Rehnquist assignments were White, Stevens, 
O’Connor, and Scalia.  These data also show that Justices Brennan, 
White, Blackmun, and Stevens received numerous assignments from 




Table 1:  Justices Who Assigned Majority Opinions: 
 1986-1993 Terms 
 
Assigning Justice Number Assigned % of Total
William H. Rehnquist 791  81.0 
William J. Brennan, Jr. 102  10.5 
Byron R. White 41  4.2 
Thurgood Marshall 1  0.1 
Harry A. Blackmun 27           2.8 
John Paul Stevens 10  1.0 
Sandra Day O’Connor 4  0.4 
Total  976  100.0 
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Table 2:  Justices Who Received Assignments: 




Number of  
Assignments Made 
by Rehnquist 
Number of  
Assignments Made by 
Associate Justices 
Percent of  
Eligible  
Assignments 
William H. Rehnquist  123 (15.5) 0  (0.0) 15.4 
William J. Brennan, Jr.  26  (3.3) 37  (20.0) 18.5 
Byron R. White  91 (11.5) 23  (12.4) 15.6 
Thurgood Marshall  58 (7.3) 14  (7.6) 18.0 
Harry A. Blackmun  68 (8.6) 25  (13.5) 14.2 
Lewis F. Powell  18 (2.3) 2  (1.1) 15.8 
John Paul Stevens  89 (11.3) 27  (14.6) 18.1 
Sandra Day O’Connor  106 (13.4) 14  (7.6) 15.8 
Antonin Scalia  89 (11.3) 14  (7.6) 13.4 
Anthony M. Kennedy  61 (7.7) 16  (8.6) 12.1 
David H. Souter  32 (4.0) 7  (3.8) 11.7 
Clarence Thomas  26 (3.3) 2  (1.1) 12.3 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  4 (0.5) 4  (2.2) 12.3 
Total  791 (100.0) 185  (100.1)  
  
 Even though Chief Justice Rehnquist disproportionately assigned 
opinions to his allies, as seen in Table 2,83 bivariate analysis of 
Rehnquist’s assignment practices does not support the basic premise 
of the agenda-setting explanation.  That is, the Chief Justice appar-
ently did not assign opinions to shape the development of the law in 
line with his preferences.  A difference in means test, presented in 
Table 3, demonstrates that Justices who received writing assignments 
from the Chief were not significantly closer to the Chief ideologically 
than those Justices who were passed over for the task.84  Perhaps, how-
ever, Chief Justice Rehnquist made efforts to set the agenda only in 
politically salient cases.85  In fact, as seen in Table 3, the Chief did as-
 
83 Justice Stevens is the lone exception. 
84 I measured ideological distance by taking the absolute difference between the 
assignor’s ideology and the ideology of Justices in the conference majority, as meas-
ured by the percentage of a Justice’s votes that were liberal in an area of law.  Data 
were taken from Spaeth, supra note 43. 
85 Politically salient cases are those cases that were reported on the front page of 
The New York Times.  See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 66, 72-76 (2000) (proposing a New York Times measure of salience for Su-
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sign politically salient cases to Justices who were significantly closer to 
him in ideology than others in the conference majority.  I do not, 
however, find a bivariate relationship supporting the strategic assign-
ment of close cases86 to Justices relatively distant from the Chief in or-
der to maintain the majority coalition.87
 
Table 3:  Difference in Means Tests for Explanations of  






Opinion Difference Probability 
 
Ideological Distance 2.11 2.00 -.11 .94 
Ideological Distance in 
Politically Salient Cases 1.66 1.87 .21 .12 
Ideological Distance in 
Minimum Winning Cases 1.83 1.46 -.37 .001 
Assignment Cycle Equity .16 .34 .18 .000 
Annual Equity .42 .43 .01 .71 
Number of Late Majority 
Opinion Drafts .93 1.05 .12 .01 
Number of Late Dissent-
ing Opinion Drafts .44 .44 .00 .58 





preme Court cases).  Data were obtained from http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/ 
salience.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
86 Close cases are those where the conference majority or plurality had five or 
fewer Justices.  I used Justice Blackmun’s docket sheets to determine which cases did 
not exceed a minimum winning coalition at the conference vote. 
87 Since Chief Justice Rehnquist occupied one of the more extreme ideological 
positions on his Court, I would expect him to assign the opinion to a Justice more dis-
tant from himself (for example, the median). 
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Table 4:  Random Effects Model of Rehnquist’s Opinion  
Assignment Decisions88
 









Politically Salient Case  .152 * 
(.086) 
Politically Salient Case * Ideological Distance  -.064 * 
(.035) 
Minimum Winning Conference Coalition  .158 * 
(.077) 
Minimum Winning Conference Coalition * 
Ideological Distance 
 .086 ** 
(.033) 
























Number of Observations 5437 5437 
Wald Chi Squared 95.97 *** 137.10 *** 
 
There is evidence from this bivariate analysis to support Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s assertion that he assigned opinions to Justices current 
 
88  Please note the following: 
* = p ≤ .05 (one-tailed test) 
** = p ≤ .01 (one-tailed test) 
*** = p ≤ .001 (one-tailed test) 
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in their work and to maintain an equitable distribution of assignments 
across the chambers.  First, there are statistically significant associa-
tions between the Chief’s assignment decisions and a Justice’s number 
of pending majority opinion drafts and votes that are past due, ac-
cording to Rehnquist.89  There is no evidence of a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between overdue dissent drafts and assignment deci-
sions.  The support for equity is more complex.  There is evidence 
that Rehnquist was reluctant to assign opinions to Justices who had re-
ceived assignments from an Associate Justice.90  This reflects the trade-
offs that Chief Justices make during a single assignment cycle.  In con-
trast, there is no evidence to support Rehnquist’s assertion that he was 
attentive to the number of assignments a Justice received during the 
Term as a whole.91
These bivariate results shift somewhat when subjected to multi-
variate controls.92  As seen in Table 4, Rehnquist was apt to assign the 
opinion, all else held constant, to a Justice who was ideologically dis-
tant from himself.  This is consistent with the findings of other studies 
of Rehnquist’s assignment decisions.93  There are two possible expla-
nations for this pattern.  First, Rehnquist may not have used his as-
signment powers routinely to maximize his policy gain.  Instead, he 
may have reserved his ideological allies for especially important cases.  
As seen in Table 2, Rehnquist was significantly less likely to assign the 
opinion to an ideologically distant Justice when the case was politically 
salient.  Interestingly, as also seen in Table 2, the pattern of favoring 
his ideological opponents was accentuated in cases with a fragile con-
ference majority. 
89 The number of late, pending majority opinion drafts, dissenting opinion drafts, 
and overdue votes were derived from the opinion logs maintained by Justice Black-
mun’s chambers.  These logs contain information on the dates when opinion drafts 
were circulated, as well as when Justices sent memos joining an opinion, which is the 
manner in which they cast their final vote. 
90 I used the assignment sheets found in Justice Blackmun’s papers to calculate 
the number of assignments each Justice received from an Associate Justice.  The as-
signment sheet designates these cases by placing the initials of the Associate Justice as-
signing the opinion next to the case name. 
91 Using information from the assignment sheets, I determined whether a Justice 
needed additional assignments to reach the running mean of assignments given to the 
Justices at that point in the Term. 
92 I estimate a multivariate model using random-effects probit where there is an 
observation for each Justice who is eligible to receive an assignment by virtue of voting 
with the conference majority. 
93 See, e.g., Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 426 (concluding that, under 
certain conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist was most likely to assign opinions to Jus-
tices ideologically distant from himself). 
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A second explanation for Rehnquist’s equal treatment of ideo-
logical allies and other Justices is that the Rehnquist Court was more 
consistently conservative than the Burger Court.  The Court, during 
much of the Rehnquist Court era, was dominated by conservative Jus-
tices, as evidenced by the shifting ideological median.  In the Terms 
examined here, 1986 to 1993, the median Justice was significantly 
more conservative than the median during the Burger Court—or even 
the median in the post-Blackmun Rehnquist Court.94  Thus, there was 
little policy gain to be realized from assigning to the ideologically 
closest Justices, as Rehnquist could be assured of a satisfactory opinion 
from a number of different Justices. 
The effect of the organizational needs articulated by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist is not as powerful when subjected to multivariate controls.  
The only significant workload factor, outlined in Rehnquist’s 1989 
memo,95 was the number of late majority opinion drafts.  It is appar-
ent that Rehnquist did penalize Justices who had a number of delin-
quent majority opinion drafts (that is, more than four weeks had 
elapsed since the Justice received the assignment).  Incidentally, the 
effect of these workload variables is not heightened as the Court ap-
proaches the end of its Term.  In addition to this workload effect, 
Rehnquist pursued the norm of equitable distribution of assignments 
within each argument session. 
CONCLUSION 
As we look toward the tenure of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 
we can extrapolate lessons for the use of opinion assignment in guid-
ing the Court.  First, the Chief Justice can use opinion assignment to 
advance his policy goals.  By assigning opinions to his ideological al-
lies, the Chief Justice may realize policy gain in cases where he stands 
with the majority or may minimize his policy loss when the majority 
takes a position contrary to his.  In the foreseeable future, though, 
Chief Justice Roberts will enjoy leading a Court where the median is a 
relatively conservative voice.  This will enable him to distribute opin-
94 Using Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn’s measure of the Court median, a dif-
ference in means test reveals that the median grows significantly more conservative 
from the 1986 Term to the 1993 Term.  See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dy-
namic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 134-51 (2002) (discussing the methods and datasets used 
to achieve these results).  Martin and Quinn’s data on Court ideology are available at 
http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
95 Rehnquist memorandum, supra note 27. 
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ion assignments across many Justices without any discernable policy 
loss. 
Nevertheless, the Chief will find himself, like Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, constrained by the strategic context of each case, as well as 
by the expectations of his colleagues.  He may reserve his allies for as-
signments to particularly salient cases, while minimizing his policy loss 
in cases with close conference votes by assigning those opinions to Jus-
tices at the center of the Court’s ideological spectrum.  At the same 
time that he strives to balance these ideological considerations, Chief 
Justice Roberts may be attentive to the effect of opinion assignment 
on the operation of the Court as an organization.  Specifically, the 
Chief Justice may, like his predecessor, equalize assignments through-
out the year by giving each Justice roughly the same number of as-
signments each cycle.  He may also use future assignments as an in-
centive to complete majority opinions previously assigned. 
Regardless of how Chief Justice Roberts seeks to balance these 
competing demands, he will come to appreciate the potential and pit-
falls of opinion assignment for advancing his vision of good legal pol-
icy.  Depending on how he chooses to deploy assignments among his 
colleagues, he may also come to see the wisdom of Justice Douglas’s 
warning that assignment tactics can lead to “a frayed and bitter Court 
full of needless strains and quarrels.”96  In an office without many pre-
rogatives of power, the ability to assign the task of writing opinions 
gives the Chief Justice the capacity to shape the Court. 
 
96 Douglas letter, supra note 6. 
